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ABSTRACT: This paper situates Hume’s views on animals in the context of  the 
Scottish Enlightenment by contrasting them with the views of  Adam Smith. While 
Smith is more central to the philosophical establishment of  the Scottish 
Enlightenment, their views on morals resemble each other greatly and both think 
that the analogies between humans and non-human animals are useful for thinking 
about morals. Their estimation of  the nature and extent of  those analogies, 
however, differ widely from one another. This has been historically obscured by the 
fact that in no single work does Smith precisely detail what he thinks non-human 
animals are capable of. I argue that Smith thinks non-human animal minds are 
different in kind from human minds. This is evident from Smith’s view of  how 
language facilitates and co-creates certain aspects of  human cognition. Hume, by 
contrast, seems to hold that non-human animal minds differ merely by degree from 
human minds. After reconstructing Smith’s view, I contrast it with Hume’s, 
providing historical context to show how Hume falls outside the mainstream on this 
issue and Smith within it. Their views on animals reflect, broadly, their standing with 
respect to the wider Scottish philosophical community. 
KEYWORDS: Hume, David; Smith, Adam; animals; animal cognition; animal minds; 
Scottish Enlightenment; language; analogy; 
INTRODUCTION 
It is widely believed that Hume’s views of  the nature and status of  animals were 
directly influenced by the skeptical thinkers that preceded him. This influence is 
usually located in Sextus, Montaigne, and Bayle, or some combination thereof.  But 1
Hume’s views on animals are also in dialogue with his more immediate context, the 
 See, e.g., Kail (2012), Kemp Smith (2005, 325), Floridi (1997), Muckler (1963), and Seidler (1977). 1
For an assessment of  these claims of  direct influence on Hume’s arguments regarding animals, see 
Fry (forthcoming).
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Scottish Enlightenment.  Adam Smith makes for an intriguing comparison with 2
Hume on this issue. On morals, both Smith and Hume form their respective views in 
dialogue with Hutcheson, and both Smith and Hume think that examining the 
analogies between humans and non-human animals will enlighten our moral 
theorizing. 
Smith repeatedly references the abilities of  non-human animals in 
comparison with humans. Sometimes this is done to illustrate what the two groups 
share, sometimes it is done with an eye to illuminating what makes humans special. 
Unlike Hume, though, Smith never gives a direct accounting of  animal mental 
capabilities: his overall view of  non-human animal mentality is left largely implicit. 
In this paper, I collate Smith’s claims about non-human animal minds to 
show that they share some key capacities with human minds, on Smith’s view. I then 
go on to argue that, despite this, Smith is committed to the view that human and 
non-human animal minds are different in kind. This is due to Smith’s understanding 
of  language’s effect on human cognition: for Smith, language is a uniquely human 
capability that extends and produces many human cognitive abilities. Thus, 
ultimately, humans have radically different cognitive capabilities from non-human 
animals. I then contrast Smith with Hume, arguing that Hume has a view whereby 
human and non-human animal minds differ only by degree. I conclude by suggesting 
that Hume’s comparatively more radical and Smith’s comparatively more 
conservative view mirror their positions with respect to the Scottish Enlightenment’s 
mainstream philosophical establishment. 
I. SMITH’S CLAIMS ABOUT ANIMALS 
At key points in Smith’s major works, he draws analogies between human and non-
human animal mentality. Early in Wealth of  Nations, Smith identifies a ‘propensity to 
truck, barter, and exchange one thing for another’ as an aspect of  human nature 
(WN I.ii.1, p.25).  Smith says of  this capability that we cannot be sure whether it is 3
‘one of  those original principles in human nature, of  which no further account can 
be given; or whether, as seems more probable, it be the necessary consequence of  
the faculties of  reason and speech.’ Examining the origin of  this faculty is not 
Smith’s task, he asserts, but he does note that 
 Wolloch (2006) treats Hume’s views on animals in the context of  the Scottish Enlightenment, but 2
does so primarily in relation to Scottish physician John Gregory, not Smith, though Smith, too, is 
addressed there.
 An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of  the Wealth of  Nations will be referenced as Wealth of  Nations or 3
WN throughout and cited by book, chapter and paragraph number, followed by page numbers, as is 
conventional. Page references are to Smith (1976).
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It is common to all men, and to be found in no other race of  
animals, which seem to know neither this nor any other species of  
contracts. Two greyhounds, in running down the same hare, have 
sometimes the appearance of  acting in some sort of  concert. Each 
turns her towards his companion, or endeavours to intercept her 
when his companion turns her towards himself. This, however, is not 
the effect of  any contract, but of  the accidental concurrence of  their 
passions in the same object at that particular time. Nobody ever saw a 
dog make a fair and deliberate exchange of  one bone for another 
with another dog. Nobody ever saw one animal by its gestures and 
natural cries signify to another, this is mine, that yours; I am willing to 
give this for that. When an animal wants to obtain something either 
of  a man or of  another animal, it has no other means of  persuasion 
but to gain the favour of  those whose service it requires. A puppy 
fawns upon its dam, and a spaniel endeavours by a thousand 
attractions to engage the attention of  its master who is at dinner, 
when it wants to be fed by him. Man sometimes uses the same arts 
with his brethren, and when he has no other means of  engaging 
them to act according to his inclinations, endeavours by every servile 
and fawning attention to obtain their good will. He has not time, 
however, to do this upon every occasion… In almost every other 
race of  animals each individual, when it is grown up to maturity, is 
intirely independent, and in its natural state has occasion for the 
assistance of  no other living creatures. But man has almost constant 
occasion for the help of  his brethren… (WN I.ii.2, p.25-6) 
Here Smith makes several comparisons between humans and non-human animals. 
First, he identifies the propensity that he has noted for ‘truck, barter and exchange’ is 
unique to human nature, and supposes that it is a ‘necessary consequence of  the 
faculties of  reason and speech.’ Thus, on Smith’s estimation, non-human animals do 
not have reason, or they do not have speech, or they do not have either; if  they did, 
he could not suppose that the human propensity to barter is a ‘natural consequence’ 
of  possessing those two faculties.  
Smith goes on to give his reasons for thinking that the propensity for barter 
is related to reason and speech and also his reason to think that this propensity is 
unique to humans. He notes first that, though there appears to be action orchestrated 
toward shared ends in non-human animals—as when two greyhounds chase prey, 
each coursing it toward the other—this is a result of  the ‘accidental concurrence of  
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their passions’ not any pre-existing agreement between the two.  Further, no gesture 4
or speech-equivalent was ever observed that indicated that animals had notions of  
ownership and/or trade.  5
That non-human animals do not engage in exchange is not a failure of  
intelligence, though, as Smith’s description of  related phenomena in the Lectures on 
Jurisprudence shows. There, Smith says of  barter: 
The brutes have no notion of  this; the dogs, as I mentiond, by having 
the same object in their view sometimes unite their labours, but never 
from contract. The same is seen still more strongly in the manner in 
which the monkeys rob an orchard at the Cape of  Good Hope.—But 
after they have very ingeniously conveyd [sic] away the apples, as they 
have no contract they fight (even unto death) and leave after many 
dead upon the spot. They have no other way of  gaining their end but 
by gaining ones favour by fawning and flattering. (LJ ms.iv.57, p.
352-3)  6
The monkeys described here are ‘ingenious’ at robbing the orchard of  apples but still 
fail to form a contract because they lack language (and can only gain each other’s 
favor through fawning). Smith again locates the difference between these animals 
and humans in the ability to speak, which is what enables humans to form contracts 
and act in concert.  Elsewhere Smith makes clear that he takes speech to be unique 7
to humans, though, interestingly, perhaps not foundational:  
The desire of  being believed, the desire of  persuading, of  leading 
and directing other people, seems to be one of  the strongest of  all 
our natural desires. It is, perhaps, the instinct upon which is founded 
the faculty of  speech, the characteristical faculty of  human nature. 
No other animal possesses this faculty, and we cannot discover in any 
 For a comparison with the similar passage in Hume, see Henderson (2006, 31-4).4
 Smith also makes this analogy with the greyhounds and lack of  exchange in dogs in Lectures on 5
Jurisprudence (LJ) ms.218-221 (p.492-493.) Throughout, Smith’s Lectures on Jurisprudence will be cited by 
manuscript page as is conventional with page numbers in Smith (1978) following.
 Smith summarizes these points again at LJ ms.222, p.494.6
 Schleisser (2017, 30) reads the passage in much the same way: Smith here is indicating that animals 7
are intelligent, but lack speech and cannot form contracts.
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other animal any desire to lead and direct the judgment and conduct 
of  its fellows. (TMS VII.iv.25, p.397-8)  8
For Smith, then, speech—and not reason—is the ‘characteristical’ faculty of  
humanity. This matches what we saw above. The use of  speech to create contracts 
and bonds, for Smith, is tied to the fact that humans are (nearly) unique insofar as 
they are not entirely independent of  one another in adulthood.  Compared to 9
humans, non-human animals have different economic, social and political 
arrangements amongst themselves because they lack speech. This lack means that 
they are not able to associate for mutual benefit by anything other than accidental 
confluence of  passions. 
But as the passages above show, the problem is not that animals lack 
intelligence. Smith thinks that humans and non-human animals are both capable of  a 
kind of  means-ends reasoning: humans and non-human animals share the ability to 
seek their ends, both through their direct actions and through ‘servile and fawning 
attention.’ The latter provides a clear case of  both humans and non-human animals 
framing a goal and executing on a plan to achieve it, as they both ingratiate 
themselves to others in order to ‘gain the favour of  those whose service’ they 
require. 
Smith clearly thinks that non-human animals possess intentions and desires 
and, further, can represent what needs to change in the world to fulfill those desires, 
as they can take actions meant to achieve the ends they represent to themselves. 
Humans and non-human animals, on Smith’s view, share a basic ability to suit means 
to ends. Thus, while humans and non-human animals differ widely from one 
another, on Smith’s view, they share much cognitively in common. 
II. SMITH’S ARGUMENTS ABOUT ANIMALS 
But how does Smith arrive at these conclusions? That is, by what reasoning does 
Smith come to think of  non-human animals as having these capabilities in particular? 
 The Theory of  Moral Sentiments will be cited (as convention dictates) by TMS with part, section and 8
paragraph numbers (along with chapter numbers where appropriate). Page numbers referencing Smith 
(2002) follow. 
 Later Smith argues that though there is a strong and consistent human nature, the differences 9
humans have from one another contribute to their well-being precisely because they are not 
independent of  one another as other animals are; see WN I.ii.5, p.29-30. Smith makes this same 
comparison elsewhere with the same context (LJ ms.vi.47-49, p.348-9). In that exposition, though, the 
claim of  a strong and consistent human nature is made more forcefully, as is the claim of  mutual 
benefit among differently-endowed humans.
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Smith does not say. Because Smith does not offer a direct or comprehensive account 
of  animal cognition (like, e.g., Hume does across Treatise 1.3.16, 2.1.12, and 2.2.12), 
one must look to his philosophical methodology generally and the other explicit 
arguments that draw on claims about animals. 
The one place that Smith makes explicit and direct arguments about animal mental 
capacities is his essay ‘Of  the External Senses.’  In the essay, Smith considers each 10
of  the five senses and examines whether its use would require representations of  
something external or apart from us. In the concluding section, ‘Of  the sense of  
seeing,’ Smith examines the evidence for the claim that the human tendency to 
identify objects seen as being external to oneself  must arise from habituation alone.  11
Smith will reject this claim, and will do so on the basis of  arguments that 
prominently feature non-human animals. 
Here, Smith gives scientifically informed arguments by analogy when 
considering animal capabilities. Smith argues that non-human animals must have 
some innate ability to navigate the world and that this would require them to be able 
to innately identify visual stimuli as depicting something external to them. He then 
argues by analogy that this must be the case for humans as well. 
Smith builds his case by considering the habits and capabilities of  the young 
of  several different sorts of  animals: 
That, antecedent to all experience, the young of  at least the greater 
part of  animals possess some instinctive perception of  this kind, 
seems abundantly evident. The hen never feeds her young by 
dropping food into their bills… Almost as soon as her chickens are 
hatched, she does not feed them, but carries them to the field to feed, 
where they walk about at their ease, it would seem, and appear to 
have the most distinct perception of  all the tangible objects which 
surround them… The young of  the partridge and of  the grouse 
seem to have the same early period… The young partridge, almost as 
soon as it comes from the shell, runs about among long grass and 
corn; the young grouse among long heath, and would both most 
essentially hurt themselves if  they had not the most acute as well as 
distinct perception of  the tangible objects which not only surround 
 Cited throughout as ES with paragraph numbers, followed by page numbers in Smith (1980). There 10
has been some suggestion that ‘Of  the External Senses’ is a juvenile work and thus not worthy of  
serious consideration, but Brown (1992) gives a convincing rebuttal. For a discussion see Glenney 
(2011, n.2), who concludes that Smith at least returned to and edited the work well into his career.
 For a complete discussion of  Smith’s arguments and goals in discussing the external world, see 11
Glenney (2011) and Glenney (2007).
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them but press upon them on all sides. This is the case too with the 
young of  the goose, of  the duck, and, so far as I have been able to 
observe, with those of  at least the greater part of  the birds which 
make their nests upon the ground. (ES 70, p.161-162) 
Similarly, birds who roost in bushes and on cliffs, though they ‘come blind from the 
shell,’ just as soon as they are granted the power of  sight at all, they  
evidently enjoy all the powers of  Vision in the most complete 
perfection, and can distinguish with most exact precision the shape 
and proportion of  the tangible objects which every visible one 
represents. In so short a period, they cannot be supposed to have 
acquired those powers from experience, and must therefore derive 
them from some instinctive suggestion. The sight of  birds seems to 
be both more prompt and more acute than that of  any other animals. 
(ES 71, p.162) 
Smith assess quadrupeds similarly, arguing that the same patterns are found in them. 
Like ground birds, the young quadruped ‘seems to enjoy from the beginning,’ the 
power of  sight ‘in as great perfection as he ever does afterwards’ (ES 73, p.163). 
Smith gives several examples, and then notes that while some are born blind, they 
acquire their sight in full immediately on the reception of  it in any degree, just as 
with birds that nest up high. 
Smith then analogizes humans and these non-human animals, saying ‘It 
seems difficult to suppose that man is the only animal of  which the young are not 
endowed with some instinctive perception of  this kind’ (ES 74, p.163). Thus, Smith 
argues, because of  the overwhelming similarities between humans and non-human 
animals, we should accept that when humans come to have sight, they immediately 
come to represent external objects as being external. Thus, such representations are 
instinctual and not learned, even in humans. 
Smith then addresses the objection that nature ‘never bestows upon any 
animal any faculty which is not either necessary or useful,’ and that human children’s 
long state of  dependence on adults allows time for mere mental association or 
habituation to do the work that instinct does in other animals. Smith’s response is to 
appeal again to observation: 
Children, however, appear at so very early a period to know the 
distance, the shape, and magnitude of  the different tangible objects 
which are presented to them, that I am disposed to believe that even 
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they may have some instinctive perception of  this kind. (ES 74, p.
163) 
This is the case even though, as Smith allows, it may be to ‘a much weaker degree 
than the greater part of  other animals.’ Smith then focuses on other observations of  
infants, leaving non-human animals behind.  12
In sum, Smith argues by analogy that because the power of  vision is 
evidently coupled from a very early age with representing external objects as external 
in non-human animals that it must also be so in humans. He is willing to give up or 
mitigate a well-worn principle (that nature does not give animals any extraneous 
capabilities) to square this account with his observations of  human infants and non-
human animal young. Smith’s reasoning is analogical and responsive to scientific 
observation. He sees humans and non-human animals as similar enough in other 
respects to underwrite claims about cognitive similarities. 
Smith is part of  a long tradition in deploying arguments of  this sort.  Smith, 13
though, is in some ways the best suited of  all of  these thinkers to make use of  this 
mode of  reasoning, given the importance he places on analogy in scientific 
reasoning. In his History of  Astronomy, he makes analogy the key to philosophico-
 For the role that analogies with children play in Smith’s conjectural history elsewhere, see 12
Swearingen (2013, 169).
 Most thinkers in the period argue for claims about the mental capabilities of  non-human animals by 13
analogizing them to humans. That is, many thinkers—including, but not limited to, Montaigne, 
Hobbes, Locke, Leibniz, Bayle, and Hume—note similarities between human and non-human animal 
behavior and use these similarities to argue analogically for claims about the cognitive capacities of  
one or both groups. 
For primary texts, see Montaigne’s Apology for Raimond Seybond (2003, 15-47), Hobbes’s Leviathan (1994) 
ch.1-6, Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1976) Book II, ch.ix-xi, the corresponding 
sections of  Leibniz’s New Essays on Human Understanding (1996), the entry for ‘Rorarius’ in Bayle’s 
Historical and Critical Dictionary, and Hume’s Treatise of  Human Nature 1.3.16, 2.1.12, 2.2.12 and Enquiry 
Concerning Human Understanding 9. 
For analysis, see Fry (forthcoming) and also Kail (2007). As a survey, Wilson (1995) is also useful. 
Note that Descartes’s mode of  reasoning is also analogical, though he weights the differences and 
disanalogies between the groups as most important (Discourse on Method, AT 55-60).
    /  8 21
scientific reasoning.  Reducing to a bare minimum the number of  principles and 14
kinds of  hypotheses that are required to connect together the observed phenomena 
is both the fundamental goal and good-making feature of  analogical reasoning. 
Smith’s arguments about animals display the implicit premise that because human 
and non-human animal behavior can be explained largely with the same principles, it 
ought to be. Differences in underlying cognitive capabilities should be posited only 
when they are absolutely required to account for observed differences, and the 
differences in cognitive capability should be as minimal as possible while maintaining 
empirical adequacy. 
Smith’s claims about animals’ ‘fawning attention’ above illustrate just this 
form of  reasoning: the same strategy is common to both humans and non-human 
animals and is given the same diagnosis in both. Differences are posited only when 
required to explain why humans do not do this on some occasions. The ability to 
speak is the underlying difference in this case, but it is appealed to only to explain 
higher level differences. 
This explains why Smith thinks humans and non-human animals share 
cognitive capacities: because analogy is the fundamental mode of  philosophico-
scientific reasoning and because humans and non-human animals share behaviors 
associated with, e.g., means-ends reasoning, we ought to, on Smith’s understanding, 
attribute the underlying capacities requires for those behaviors to non-human 
animals. 
However, there are still differences between the two groups: humans and 
non-human animals are both cognitive beings, for Smith, but linguistic ability is a key 
difference between them. While much of  our behavior is analogous, and thus we 
should attribute similar underlying cognitive causes for that behavior, humans are 
linguistic and animals are not. This, I argue in the following section, shows Smith to 
think of  the difference between human and non-human animal minds as a difference 
in kind, not a difference of  degree. Though we are both minded, thinking beings for 
Smith, humans and non-human animals have different sorts of  minds. 
 See HA II.12, p.45. Smith’s History of  Astronomy will be cited, as is conventional, by section and 14
paragraph number. Page references to Smith 1980 follow. Analogy reduces the riot of  seeming 
irregularities, confusions and distractions by introducing order by systematizing phenomena. By 
‘smoothing the passage of  the imagination’ systematization renders unfamiliar or seemingly 
discordant sets of  phenomena in terms of  transitions which the mind naturally accepts, that is, 
connections between events with which it is familiar (HA II.12, p.47). When analogy was deployed 
well and consistently, it ‘became the great hinge upon which every thing turned’ (HA II.12, p.46-7). 
All philosophico-scientific reasoning, according to Smith, is analogical. On this point, see Thomson 
(1965, 225-6).
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III: FOR SMITH, A DIFFERENCE IN KIND 
To consider the question of  difference, we first must assess the role that language 
plays in human cognition for Smith. Fortunately, there is already work on this topic. 
Schliesser (2011), for instance, argues that, for Smith, ‘language and mind co-
develop.’ Looking at Smith’s ‘Considerations Concerning the First Formation of  
Languages’ shows this.  There Smith gives a conjectural history of  the way that 15
language developed, starting first with names of  events and objects, then kinds and 
adjectives, and so on.  16
Smith believes that, e.g., naming of  particular objects generates the cognitive 
need—and the cognitive capacity—to use general names. The use of  general names 
then requires distinguishing individuals within kinds, bringing online new cognitive 
capacities, which then facilitate further language growth. The process repeats for 
qualities, relations, etc. For Smith, language enables cognitive capacities that would 
otherwise not be present, and those capacities go on to sharpen the linguistic tools 
available, which in turn enable further cognitive capacities and so on. Fundamentally, 
some of  our cognitive capacities depend on our language. The capabilities enabled 
by speech include, e.g., the ability to think about kinds, qualities, relations, numbers 
as abstracted from concrete quantities, the ability to think of  the self  as an 
individual, and the greater part of  metaphysics.  17
Human and non-human animal behavior and its causes (on Smith’s 
estimation) are very similar.  Given those similarities and Smith’s commitment to 18
analogy, we should expect that human and non-human mentality will be explained in 
very similar ways. But remember that Smith’s commitment to analogy can be 
 Originally published as a free-standing essay, Smith later thought it so important that he appended it 15
to the 3rd edition of  Theory of  Moral Sentiments. ‘Considerations Concerning the First Formation of  
Languages’ will be cited as Languages, with page numbers referencing Smith (1853).
 For thorough consideration of  the structure, argumentation and context of  this essay, see Land 16
(1977) and Swearingen (2013).
 See Languages p.515-21, p.529.17
 Further analogies than those already discussed include, e.g., that both have propensities fit to their 18
self-preservation and the propagation of  their species (TMS II.i.v.10, p.90). Both strike out at things 
that injure them (TMS II.iii.i.1, p.110). Smith notes that we rank non-human animals as similar enough 
to us to be suited to punishment, or, at least, more similar than inanimate objects and so more 
deserving (TMS II.iii.i.3-4, p.111-2). (On this point, see also the related passage at LJ ii.177 (p.139), see 
also LJ ii.118-9 (p.116).) We work similarly, and deserve similar appellations: Smith, for instance, 
identifies both farmhands and cattle as ‘productive labourers’ in the field. (WN II.v.12, p.363-4). For a 
discussion of  this passage, see Pesciarelli (1999).
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overridden or mitigated by difference in the capacities that are needed to explain the 
observed behavior. This is what we saw with the passages from Wealth of  Nations, 
where Smith attributes enough underlying capacity difference to explain the 
difference in observed behavior. 
Despite their similarity, in ‘Of  the External Senses’ Smith says that humans 
are indeed superior to non-human animals, and that this is by nature’s design: 
…and [a human] at no time takes any further concern in it than he is 
obliged to do by that fellow-feeling which Nature has, for the wisest 
purposes, implanted in man, not only towards all other men, but 
(though no doubt in a much weaker degree) towards all other 
animals. Having destined him to be the governing animal in this little 
world, it seems to have been her benevolent intention to inspire him 
with some degree of  respect, even for the meanest and weakest of  
his subjects. (ES, p.136) 
Humans and non-human animals are ‘destined’ by nature for different ends. As such, 
they have different capacities. While human nature may develop over time as a result 
of  social and linguistic activity, for Smith, it has within it the capacities that 
(inevitably) bring about the dominion of  humans over the other parts of  nature: 
since humans are destined to govern, according to Smith, they are given the capacities 
suitable to doing so (including, in this case, a catholic sense of  fellow-feeling).  19
Human superiority is thus rooted in differences of  capacity, and at least some of  the 
relevant differences are linguistic and cognitive.  These cognitive differences 20
produce human minds that are uniquely suited to dominion over the inferior parts of  
nature. 
 On human nature as not fixed for Smith, see Schliesser (2011).19
 These differences would seem to be ultimately rooted in biological differences for Smith—see 20
Phillipson (2013, 32)—but exploring Smith’s views on biology and its relation to mental capacity is 
outside the scope of  this paper. What is clear is that there are fundamental cognitive differences in 
predisposition for linguistic activity, and whatever the ultimate origin of  those differences, those 
differences act to create separation between humans and non-human animals, which ramify to create 
further cognitive and linguistic differences.
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Smith takes speech to be the key difference between humans and other 
animals and as the trait most fundamental to understanding humanity.  This, 21
combined with the extremely important role speech plays in our more sophisticated 
cognitive capacities, suggests that human and non-human animal minds are different 
in kind for Smith. So, while the explanations for the analogous parts of  their 
behavior are shared, the very different (e.g., linguistic, economic, moral) behavior 
puts a difference in kind between human and non-human animal minds, for Smith.  22
The question of  difference in kind is, of  course, a thorny one, particularly as 
the question must itself  be disambiguated before it can be answered. ‘Difference in 
kind’ is traditionally contrasted with ‘difference in degree’: identifying minds as 
different in kind is meant to assert that they differ by more than just the extent to 
which they have certain shared capacities. It is, in short, to claim that they are disjoint 
in their capabilities: some minds must have capacities that the others do not. The 
greater the number of  unshared capacities, the better the case for difference in kind. 
Further, how important the shared (or not shared) capacities are to the execution of  
a typical life by those creatures also matters: if  the behaviors related to or enabled by 
the different capacities are extraordinarily important for the creature in question, 
then, ceteris paribus, the case for difference in kind is stronger. 
On this understanding, Smith would qualify as taking human and non-human 
animal minds to be different in kind as there are fundamental differences in 
capacities between the two groups and those fundamental differences ramify to 
produce very sophisticated mental abilities in one group that are not present in the 
other. 
Further, these cognitive capacities produce human society and the division of  
labor, on which all of  human economic activity is founded. They would also seem to 
be implicated in, e.g., ability to assess and place blame, culpability for blameworthy 
 This is the case even though speech and the attendant reasoning capabilities might not be 21
fundamental; recall that Smith speculated that ‘the desire of  being believed … seems to be one of  the 
strongest of  all our natural desires’ in humans, and ‘perhaps, the instinct upon which is founded the 
faculty of  speech, the characteristical faculty of  human nature’ (TMS VII.iv.25, p.397-8). While 
reducing the number and kind of  basic cognitive differences between humans and animals to a 
minimum by here attributing only a difference in desire to be believed—which then goes on to 
produce the differences in language, etc.—he still identifies speech as the more important faculty for 
contrasting humanity with non-human animals.
 In claiming a difference in kind, I am arguing contra Wolloch (2013). Wolloch argues that Smith sees 22
humans and non-human animals as differing merely in degree. Wolloch’s account acknowledges many 
of  the same comparisons and contrasts that I have pointed to here. However, it does not consider, as 
this paper does, the extent of  difference in cognitive capacities that the differences in the propensity 
to speak introduce.
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actions, how well we imaginatively place ourselves in the situation of  others and 
sympathize with them—in short, all of  the capacities relevant for morality. 
In sum, radically different institutions and forms of  life are eventually 
brought about by the basic differences in capacities that Smith identifies, and those 
institutions and forms of  life are incredibly important to even average members of  
the human species. Smith holds that human and non-human animal minds are, 
ultimately, different in kind and that language enables and facilitates this difference. 
This is not surprising for a professor who devoted much of  his lecturing to rhetoric 
and belles lettres because he that thought that ‘the best method of  explaining and 
illustrating the various powers of  the human mind, the most useful part of  
metaphysics, arises from an examination of  the several ways of  communicating our 
thoughts by speech.’  23
IV. HUME, CONTEXT, COMPARISON 
This puts Smith in stark contrast with his countryman and friend, David Hume. 
Hume goes out of  his way in his sections on non-human animal minds (Treatise 
1.3.16, 2.1.12 and 2.2.12 and EHU 9) to emphasize continuity between humans and 
non-human animals, identifying the fundamental capacities relevant for navigating 
the world (associations and causal reasoning) and engaging with others (the passions 
and sympathy) as being shared.  Hume is silent as to whether non-human animals 24
share with humans the capacities for some more sophisticated sorts of  reasoning 
(namely demonstrative and intuitive reasoning), but Hume also systematically 
downplays the importance of  such reasoning, playing up instead the importance of  
the kinds of  (causal) reasoning shared between humans and non-human animals.  25
It is thus fair to say of  Hume that he sees humans and non-human animals as 
having minds that are of  the same kind: Hume gives no account of  humans and 
non-human animals as having disjoint capacities, the capacities that may or may not 
be shared (e.g., demonstrative reasoning) do not comprise a large proportion of  the 
mental faculties that humans have, nor are they important, on Hume’s estimation, for 
leading a typical human life. Smith, remember, sees language as facilitating more 
 Millar, a pupil of  Smith’s, attributes this view to him (see Stewart 1853, p.xvi). These lectures are 23
presented in Smith (1983).
 I follow convention in citing Hume’s Treatise (Hume 2000) by section and paragraph number. For 24
instance, a reference to Treatise Book I, part 3, section 7, paragraph 5 would appear as ‘T 1.3.7.5.’ 
Hume’s Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (Hume 1999) and Enquiry Concerning the Principles of  
Morals (Hume 1998) are cited by section and paragraph as EHU and EPM respectively.
 See Driver (2011) and Beauchamp (1998).25
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abstract and metaphysical thinking. Hume, by contrast, sees the sort of  thinking 
enabled by these abstract and metaphysical terms as useless or, worse, completely 
empty.  26
Nothing more strongly underscores how human and animal minds are 
comparable for Hume than the fact that Hume’s arguments regarding animal 
cognition are tightly wedded to his arguments about human cognition.  Hume’s key 27
argument for the conclusion of  Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding 9 rests on the 
claim that while ‘Animals are not guided in these inferences by reasoning: Neither are 
children: Neither are the generality of  mankind: Neither are philosophers 
themselves, who, in all the active parts of  life, are, in the main, the same with the 
vulgar’ (EHU 9.5).   28
Further, Hume spends the long footnote to Enquiry 9.5 explaining why it is 
contingent differences in mental acuity—and not differences in mental powers per se
—that explain the observed differences between individual humans with respect to 
their abilities in this area and also the differences between humans and non-human 
animals. Notably, language use is implicated only in passing in his final point about 
testimony. The vast bulk of  differences in reasoning ability, Hume takes it, can be 
explained without any recourse to language. 
There are two places in Hume’s wider corpus where he seems to compare 
human mental faculties favorably to those of  non-human animals. The first is in his 
discussion of  justice in the second Enquiry, where Hume says that considerations of  
justice do not apply to human interactions with non-human animals (EPM 3.19). 
However, this is not because they are not rational, nor even because their minds are 
different from ours: like the imagined creatures of  the thought experiment in the 
previous paragraph, it is because weakness of  body and mind makes it so that they 
could ‘never make us feel the effects of  their resentment’ (EPM 3.18). This speaks to 
difference of  degree. That degree of  difference between humans and non-human 
animals has consequences, but it alone does not make for a difference of  kind. 
Whereas Smith sees human dominion over animals as inevitable, given human 
faculties, for Hume it is contingent on animals’ infirmity of  reasoning and body. This 
is a clear example of  Smith seeing a difference of  kind where Hume sees a difference 
of  degree. 
 One might have thought that language plays a crucial role in our cognition of  objects, for Hume, 26
but this would require denying to non-human animals things Hume explicitly attributes to them. See 
Butler (2010).
 On this connection, generally, see Boyle (2003) and Fry (forthcoming).27
 This same point applies, though less directly, to Treatise 1.3.16 as well.28
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The second is his essay, ‘Of  the Dignity or Meanness of  Human Nature.’ 
There, Hume evaluates the case for the conclusion that human nature is ‘mean’ or 
base. In doing so, Hume gives a short catalogue of  ways human thought surpasses 
non-human animal thought. Many of  the differences that Hume notes are 
comparable to the differences that he gives in the long footnote cited above from the 
first Enquiry, suggesting a difference in the strength of  the cognitive powers between 
the groups. Hume does go further, though, when he says that human thought is ‘not 
limited by any narrow bounds, either of  place or time,’ but that non-human animal 
thought is ‘limited in its observations and reasonings to a few sensible objects which 
surround it’ (DM 5).  However, this difference does not make for a difference in 29
kind because, as Hume goes on to note, the quality of  human and non-human 
animal reasoning forms a spectrum; it is because we are able to selectively compare 
only bits of  that spectrum that humans sometimes come out looking sophisticated 
(and sometimes not). This is all consistent with the connected hierarchy of  reasoning 
ability that Hume elucidated in Enquiry 9.5, where animals are comparable to children 
and people leading their everyday lives. If  we do not wish to saddle Hume with the 
view that children’s minds are different in kind from adult humans’ minds—for 
which there appears to be scant evidence in Hume’s texts—then we should take non-
human animal minds to be similar in kind as well. 
Hume and Smith, then, despite both seeing animals as having basic capacities 
for reasoning, have notably different views on the ultimate status of  non-human 
animals. Neither position is unique in the time period, though the two positions are 
affiliated with radically different cohorts. Though it is not possible to do justice to 
the question of  these other thinkers’ views here, seeing non-human animals as 
different in kind from humans is the mainstream position, occupied by, e.g., 
Descartes, Leibniz, and Locke, to name a few. Hume’s position is more closely 
affiliated with the skeptics; Montaigne and Bayle, for example, both seem to be 
skeptical of  attempts to draw a difference in kind between human and non-human 
animal minds.  So neither Smith nor Hume have views that are unprecedented, 30
though Hume’s are notably more outside the philosophical mainstream than Smith’s.  
 This echos some of  Locke’s discussion of  non-human animals in Essay II.xi. Fully exploring this 29
echo, however, is beyond the scope of  this paper. Hume’s ‘Of  the Dignity or Meanness of  Human 
Nature’ is cited here by paragraph. Quotations are from Hume (1995).
 Though on the differences of  Hume’s arguments and conclusions from Montaigne and Bayle, see 30
Fry (forthcoming). Spinoza, another philosophical outsider in the period, is often interpreted as 
thinking of  human and non-human animal minds as fundamentally the same, but then again, they are 
also fundamentally the same as, e.g., rocks, making him a tricky case, comparatively.
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This mirrors their positions with respect to the philosophical establishment 
of  the Scottish Enlightenment: Smith was much closer to the philosophical 
establishment of  the time than Hume was and had a more direct impact within it. 
Smith was trained at Glasgow and then at Oxford; Hume, after his brief  studies at 
Edinburgh, where he did not take a degree, was largely self-taught. Smith went on to 
hold, for a period, the Chair of  Logic at Glasgow University before occupying the 
prestigious Chair of  Moral Philosophy. This chair had been previously held by 
Francis Hutcheson and later went on to be held by Thomas Reid. Hume, by contrast, 
was famously rebuffed for professorial positions at universities in Edinburgh and 
Glasgow. Smith had students (e.g., Dugald Stewart) that went on to hold chairs and 
professorships; Hume did not. By any measure, the formal philosophical 
establishment of  the time in Scotland counted Smith as one of  their own while it 
excluded Hume.  31
It is surprising that Smith and Hume differ so radically from one another on 
this issue, though. Both Smith and Hume develop their moral system in response to 
Hutcheson, building on and embroidering that system in similar ways.  Further, 32
both authors make extensive use of  associationist psychology and both found their 
picture of  morality on the passions. Both authors take these associative abilities to be 
shared between humans and non-human animals. But it is difference in speech ability 
and the extensive story Smith has about the relationship of  speech to cognition that 
ultimately put a stark difference between human and non-human animal minds for 
him. Given that both Smith and Hume think that animal cognition will be useful for 
our thinking about morals, their starkly different views on the status of  animals is 
surprising, especially in light of  their other agreements. 
In no way do I mean to make a causal claim here, but it is clear that Smith’s 
relatively more mainstream philosophical opinion is consistent with his relative 
sociological positioning, and Hume’s more heterodox view is consistent with his 
location outside that mainstream philosophical establishment. Further, Smith, who 
evinced caginess with respect to engaging publicly on matters religious, also 
presented a view that was at least largely consistent with commonly held religious 
tenets: humans and non-human animals are different in kind and humankind’s 
 Rasmussen (2017) provides a panoptic view and comparison of  Smith and Hume’s standing and 31
reception in the period; it also provides a view into the informal clubs and circles of  the Scottish 
Enlightenment, of  which Hume, like Smith, was very much a fixture.
 Both regularly cite Hutcheson as an influence, but for more, on Hutcheson’s influence on Hume, 32
see Kemp Smith (2005, ch.2); on Smith, see Pesciarelli (1999); and see Vandenberg and DeHart (2013) 
generally.
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dominion over animals assured.  Hume’s view on animals, by contrast, was 33
associated with skepticism and irreligion, two charges consistently leveled at Hume 
more generally. Their positions on animals set them apart from each other and 
reflect how they are positioned with respect to the philosophical enlightenment of  
Scotland at the time. 
 On Smith’s caginess, see Rasmussen (2017), especially chs. 3, 5 and 10.33
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